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During the late 1990s, Colorado’s Taxpayer’s
Bill of Rights was praised widely for its effective-
ness in restraining the growth of government and
providing tax relief for the residents of the state.
TABOR capped government revenue growth at
population plus inflation and mandated imme-
diate rebates of surplus revenues. 
Now TABOR is under attack by interest groups
that want to increase government taxation faster
than the cap will allow. They blame TABOR for the
pressure the state budget has faced over the last four
years. Yet that pressure is a direct result not of
TABOR but of a recession, a drought, and a mis-
guided educational-spending mandate that forced
government to spend more money than it collected.
Opponents of TABOR have endorsed Refer-
endum C as a much-needed fix to TABOR.
However, far from simply tinkering with TABOR,
Referendum C puts government growth in over-
drive. The referendum would in effect give
Colorado state government a blank check for the
next five years. It would also permanently change
the way the TABOR cap is calculated and lock in
for perpetuity more government spending. 
This paper sets the record straight on what
really caused the budget problems in Colorado
and what passage of Referendum C would mean
to fiscal control in that state.
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Introduction
During the late 1990s, Colorado’s Taxpay-
er’s Bill of Rights, passed in 1992, was praised
widely for its ability to restrain the growth of
government and provide tax relief for the resi-
dents of the state. Starting in 2001, however,
Colorado began facing budgetary shortfalls,
and many observers blamed TABOR for the fis-
cal problems that the state was facing.
However, a thorough examination of Col-
orado’s recent fiscal history shows that TABOR
had virtually nothing to do with the state’s budg-
etary woes. Instead, Colorado endured a revenue
decline caused by a nationwide economic slow-
down and a severe drought in the state. Indeed,
Colorado government would have been much
bigger if TABOR had not been in force. The rev-
enue decline was made even worse by an educa-
tion-funding mandate that required Colorado
to spend increasing amounts on education,
even as revenues were declining. 
An honest appraisal of Colorado’s recent
fiscal history shows that, contrary to the claims
of TABOR’s detractors, the recent budget
shortfalls were caused by other factors. In fact,
the fixes that have been proposed by Gov. Bill
Owens and the Democratic legislature—Ref-
erendum C, in particular—miss the point
entirely. Those people focus their attention on
circumventing TABOR and permanently in-
creasing the size of government. They ignore
completely the main culprit of the budget
problem, the Amendment 23 education-
spending mandate.
Policymakers in several other states are
currently considering revenue limits as a
mechanism for fiscal discipline. They can
learn a great deal from the history of TABOR.
Indeed, TABOR’s unique design has made it
America’s best and most effective fiscal limit
for the past 13 years. 
A Brief History of TABOR
Currently, 30 states have some sort of tax
and expenditure limit (TEL) on the annual
growth of either expenditures or revenues.1
However, most limits are largely ineffective at
limiting government growth. There are several
reasons for that. Many of the limits were
passed by state legislatures that usually do not
have the incentive to place long-term binding
constraints on their own ability to tax and
spend. Furthermore, many of the limits are set
too high to bind revenue and expenditure
growth or have any meaningful effect.2
A few TELs established lower limits for gov-
ernment growth and have enjoyed some short-
term success. They include California’s Gann
Limit and Washington State’s I-601. However,
the best example of a revenue limit that has
enjoyed significant long-term success is
Colorado’s Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights. 
TABOR was authored by anti-tax activist
Douglas Bruce. In both 1988 and 1990 Bruce
attempted to enact tax reductions and fiscal
limitations in Colorado through the initiative
process. Both of those efforts proved unsuc-
cessful. However, in 1992 Bruce’s efforts bore
fruit. His Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights received
enough signatures to qualify for the November
ballot and was later enacted with more than 53
percent of the vote.
TABOR contains several features that have
been very effective at limiting the growth of
government and generating tax relief for
Colorado taxpayers. TABOR limits revenue
growth to the inflation rate plus population
growth and mandates immediate refunds of
surplus revenues to taxpayers.3 Furthermore,
TABOR is constitutional, not statutory, and
as such cannot be overturned by a vote of the
legislature.4 Finally, the only way the Colorado
legislature can spend surplus tax revenue is if
voters let it: TABOR restrains government by
requiring voter approval for any increases in
government spending beyond the limit.
Shortly after TABOR was enacted, state
revenue began to exceed the expenditure
limit that was mandated by TABOR. As a
result, Colorado taxpayers were entitled to
tax rebates. Overall, between 1997 and 2002,
Colorado reduced taxes more than any other
state, issuing annual tax rebates that totaled
more than $3.2 billion (Table 1).5
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TABOR has also allowed Colorado residents
to see the costs inherent in government pro-
grams. In other states, residents often support
higher government spending because they can
see the benefits of a particular program but
remain blissfully unaware of the costs that they
and other taxpayers will be forced to bear.
However, in Colorado the annual tax
rebates bring those tradeoffs clearly into focus.
If a voter decides to vote in favor of letting
state politicians spend the tax surpluses, he is
actively agreeing to give up his tax refund.
That is in stark contrast with most other states
in which voters may be able to vote on increas-
es in particular government spending pro-
grams while assuming that somebody else will
pay for them. In Colorado, it’s very clear who is
paying for the growth of government.
As a result, TABOR was very rarely breached
at the state level. In every year from 1993 to
1999 there was a proposal on the state ballot to
either raise taxes or increase spending in excess
of the TABOR limit. Knowing those initiatives
would markedly reduce the size of their annual
tax rebate, voters soundly defeated each of
them.6
Trouble in Paradise: What’s
to Blame for Colorado’s 
Budget Problems?
During the late 1990s, TABOR rightly
received a lot of credit for Colorado’s boom-
ing economy and strong fiscal position.
However, in 2001 the situation changed.
TABOR was suddenly being blamed for
Colorado’s frequent budgetary shortfalls and
budget cuts. An analysis of the fiscal history
of that time shows that TABOR was not to
blame. Instead, the main causes were a sharp
revenue decline corresponding with the 2001
recession and an education-funding man-
date that exempts education spending from
the TABOR caps.
The Recession and Sharp Revenue
Decline
Between 2001 and 2002 revenues subject
to the TABOR limit declined from $8.8 bil-
lion to $7.7 billion, a decline of more than 12
percent (Table 2).7 Furthermore, in fiscal
2003 revenues declined for a second consecu-
tive year. It is easy to see how an unexpected
decline in revenues of more than 13 percent
in two years could strain Colorado’s budget. 
Colorado was not alone. Virtually all states
experienced a decline in revenue starting in fis-
cal 2001. According to data from the National
Association of State Budget Officers, aggre-
gate general fund revenue of all states fell by 6
percent between fiscal year 2001 and fiscal
year 2002.8
However, revenues declined considerably
more sharply in Colorado than in other states.
That was because Colorado fared worse eco-
nomically than a number of other states dur-
ing that time period. The September 11, 2001,
attacks occurred right before the start of ski
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Table 1
Tax Rebates in Colorado under TABOR (in millions)
Year Rebate
1997 $139
1998 $563
1999 $679
2000 $941
2001 $927
Total $3,249
Source: Colorado Office of State Planning and Budgeting, “TABOR—The Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights: Special Report,”
September 2004, Table 1, p. 3.
season in Colorado. Since many Americans
stayed away from air travel after the attacks,
Colorado’s tourism industry suffered. The
first part of the 2001–02 ski season saw visits
decline by 14 percent, resulting in a loss of rev-
enue for the state.9
A bigger economic hit came in the form of
the 2002 drought, the worst in more than 25
years.10 All 64 Colorado counties were declared
a federal disaster area for the first time since
the 1977 drought.11 Furthermore, tree ring
studies indicate that 2002 was the driest year
since 1703 in the South Platte basin and since
1579 along the Colorado River.12 Not surpris-
ingly, that severe drought had a negative
impact on agriculture, one of the largest sec-
tors of the Colorado economy. The drought
also resulted in a record number of forest fires
in Colorado, which cost federal, state, and
local governments more than $150 million.13
Tourism and agriculture are both major
sectors of Colorado’s economy. In fact,
tourism accounts for 8 percent of all jobs in
Colorado, and agriculture employs 3.9 percent
of Colorado’s workforce.14 It is easy to see how
severe downturns in those industries could
have a detrimental impact on Colorado’s
economy. Manufacturing employs 9.3 percent
of Colorado’s workforce, and many individu-
als in food products manufacturing lost jobs
because of the decline in agricultural output.15
Clearly, the economic hardship brought on by
the drought contributed to Colorado’s sub-
stantial decline in revenues in fiscal 2002.
Amendment 23
In November 2000 Colorado voters
passed Amendment 23 to the state constitu-
tion. That amendment mandates a yearly
increase in funding for K-12 public educa-
tion. Specifically, Amendment 23 requires
that Colorado increase per pupil funding for
K-12 education by at least inflation plus 1
percent each year until FY2010–11. Starting
in FY2011–12 Amendment 23 mandates
increases in per pupil expenditures by at least
the inflation rate.16
To provide money for that additional
spending, Amendment 23 established the
State Education Fund. The amendment cap-
italized that fund by mandating that rev-
enues equaling a third of 1 percent of federal
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Table 2
TABOR Revenues, by Fiscal Year (in millions)
Year Revenue
1993 $5,057
1994 $5,386
1995 $5,757
1996 $6,124
1997 $6,648
1998 $7,435
1999 $7,932
2000 $8,503
2001 $8,877
2002 $7,752
2003 $7,713
2004 $8,332
2005 $8,493
Source: Colorado Office of State Planning and Budgeting, “TABOR—The Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights: Special
Report,” September 2004, p. 3; and idem, “September 2005 Revenue Forecast,” September 2005, p. 5.
taxable income be deposited in the fund.17
Revenues diverted to the State Education
Fund are explicitly exempted from TABOR
and other constitutional limitations.
Keep in mind that TABOR limits growth
in per capita revenues to approximately the
inflation rate. Since Amendment 23 man-
dates that per pupil spending increase by the
inflation rate plus 1 percent, it guarantees
that education will consume a progressively
larger share of Colorado’s budget until 2011.
That will inevitably place greater strain on
other government programs. Because of that,
some observers feel that the authors of
Amendment 23 were partly interested in
undermining TABOR.
Those education-funding increases are
constitutionally required even when overall
revenues decline. As a result, Colorado’s rev-
enue shortfall was exacerbated by the fact that
the state had to spend additional sums on
education every year. Needless to say, that put
considerable strain on the Colorado budget.
The Fiscal Effects of Amendment 23
Amendment 23 requires mandatory
increases in two separate categories of educa-
tion spending. First, it mandates that state per
pupil spending increase by the inflation rate
plus 1 percentage point. Second, it requires
that funding for what the state calls “categori-
cal programs” increase annually at the same
rate.18 Categorical programs include special
education programs, English-language profi-
ciency programs, public school transporta-
tion, Colorado Vocational Act spending, the
expelled and at-risk student services grant pro-
gram, “small attendance center” aid, and com-
prehensive health education.19
As seen in Table 3, between fiscal 2001 and
fiscal 2006 state funding earmarked for per
pupil education has increased from $2.0 bil-
lion to $2.8 billion—an increase of 39 percent.
Between 2001 and 2006 categorical funding
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The Recession’s Impact on Tourism in 2002
• Skier visits during the 2001–02 ski season declined by 4.4 percent.
• Overall National Park visits declined 8 percent.
• The rafting industry experienced its first decline in commercial visits since records start-
ed being kept in 1988.
• It is estimated that revenues for water-based state parks declined between 20 percent and
53 percent.
• Fishing license sales decreased approximately 15 percent.
• Estimates of the decrease in visits to privately owned parks and campgrounds range from
15 to 30 percent.
The Drought’s Impact on Agriculture
• Dry-land wheat production was only 45 percent of the 10-year average.
• Irrigated corn production was 50 to 85 percent of average. 
• Sunflower crop yields were down 71 percent.
• Cattle breeding stock was reduced 40 to 50 percent statewide. Southern Colorado ranchers
lost 80 percent of their herds. Losses to ranchers neared $460 million.
• Dairies (with 500 head or more) lost between $15,000 and $20,000 per month.
Source: State of Colorado Water Availability Task Force, “2003 Drought Impact and Mitigation Report,” April 14,
2003. 
increased from $142 million to around $170
million, an increase of 20 percent. Overall,
since the passage of Amendment 23, categori-
cal and per pupil spending has increased by
$818 million. That is an increase of more than
37 percent since fiscal 2001.
To really capture the full impact of
Amendment 23 and the spending increases—
and how they exacerbated the state budget—
one has to examine what happened to the
TABOR limit during that time. Amendment
23 caused a reduction in the TABOR limit
because it used part of Colorado’s existing
income tax receipts to create the State
Education Fund, which was exempt from the
TABOR limit. To see how much total revenue
in Colorado actually declined, the State
Educa-tion Fund monies should be added to
the TABOR revenues in Table 2. The revised
numbers for fiscal years 2001 through 2005
are given in Table 4.
As noted before, spending on education
increased in Colorado by $818 million between
2001 and 2006 as a result of the Amendment 23
mandate. Yet that occurred at a time when gen-
eral revenues (TABOR revenues plus the State
Education Fund) declined by $226 million. It is
easy to see how the spending increases mandat-
ed by Amendment 23 coupled with the sharp
revenue decline strained the Colorado budget. 
The California Experience 
of the 1980s
Opponents of Colorado’s TABOR are
pursuing a strategy that is very similar to the
one pursued by opponents of California’s
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Table 3
Education-Spending Mandates (in millions)
State Share of District State Funding for
Fiscal Year Program Funding Categorical Programs Combined
2001 $2,048 $142 $2,190
2006 $2,838 $170 $3,008
Total increase $790 $28 $818
Percentage increase 39% 20% 37%
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Colorado Joint Budget Committee, 2005–2006 Appropriations
Report, February 2005, pp. 63, 73.
Table 4
TABOR Revenues Plus Special Education Fund Revenues (in millions)
Year Revenue
2000 $8,503
2001 $9,043
2002 $8,039
2003 $7,948
2004 $8,626
2005 $8,817
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from Colorado Joint Budget Committee, 2004–2005 Appropriations
Report, February 2004, pp. 63, 73; and Colorado Office of State Planning and Budgeting, “TABOR—The Taxpayer’s
Bill of Rights: Special Report,” September 2004, p. 3.
Gann Limit almost 20 years ago. In the early
1980s California’s Gann Limit enjoyed some
success at constraining government growth.
However, later in the decade it was under-
mined by an education-spending mandate
similar to Colorado’s Amendment 23.
The Gann Limit was first proposed after
the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978. At that
time, many fiscal conservatives were con-
cerned that state and local governments
would raise other taxes to compensate for
property tax reductions brought about by
Proposition 13. To preserve tax relief, fiscal
conservatives sought to place a cap on overall
state expenditures. The Gann Limit received
enough signatures to appear on the
November 1979 ballot.20 Receiving only token
opposition, it passed with more than 74 per-
cent of the vote on November 4, 1979.21
The Gann Limit had some flaws. It limit-
ed appropriations only of tax revenue, and, as
a result, the legislature responded by raising
more revenue from nontax sources. Still, the
Gann Limit proved to be relatively effective at
keeping spending in check. Between 1980
and 1991, California’s rank in state per capi-
ta expenditures fell from 7th to 16th. Its rank
in per capita revenues fell from 9th to 14th
during the same time period.22 Furthermore,
when tax receipts exceeded the Gann Limit in
1987, the state was forced to refund $1.1 bil-
lion in surplus revenues to the taxpayers.23
Ironically, the 1987 rebate may have led to
the downfall of the Gann Limit. The rebate
angered education interests that wanted a por-
tion of the money to be used to increase school
spending. Indeed, teachers’ unions and other
opponents of the Gann Limit pursued a strat-
egy that was very similar to the one that oppo-
nents of TABOR are pursuing in Colorado. 
First, California’s education lobby respond-
ed by working for the 1988 passage of
Proposition 98. Passed in 1988, Proposition 98
required that public schools receive a share of
any revenues that exceeded the Gann Limit.24
Even more damaging was Proposition 98’s
requirement that the state provide compensa-
tion for any decreases in education spending
that occurred when revenues declined.
The increases in education spending came
at the expense of other state programs and
generated more hostility toward the limit. As
a result, in 1990 the transportation lobby was
able to enact Proposition 111, which exempt-
ed gasoline taxes from the Gann Limit. More
important, Proposition 111 also raised the
spending limit by tying the limit to per capi-
ta income growth instead of inflation.25 That
set a considerably higher limit—indeed, one
so high as to render the Gann Limit virtually
meaningless.
The weakening of the Gann Limit had neg-
ative consequences for California’s fiscal
health. Since the state obtains much of its tax
revenue through a steeply progressive income
tax, receipts tend to increase sharply during
times of prosperity and dip greatly during
recessions. That is what happened during the
tech boom of the late 1990s, and the Gann
Limit was powerless to prevent the 48 percent
increase in spending that occurred during
Gray Davis’s first three years in office.26 When
the tech bubble burst in 2000 and 2001, the
end result was a $38 billion shortfall.27 In fact,
budget deficits persist to this day, partly as a
result of a lack of a meaningful spending
limit.28 California taxpayers are still paying the
price for weakening the Gann Limit. 
The Ratchet Back Effect
The TABOR limit resets itself at the end of
every fiscal year. This is known by some peo-
ple as the “ratchet back” effect because, if rev-
enues decline, the TABOR limit declines as
well.29 That’s because TABOR uses as its
benchmark the previous year’s cap or actual
tax revenue, whichever is lower. From that
benchmark, the new revenue cap is calculat-
ed by increasing the benchmark by the previ-
ous year’s rate of population growth plus
inflation. 
For example, TABOR took effect in fiscal
year 1994. Hypothetically, if revenues fell
from $8 billion in 1994 to $4 billion in 1995,
the TABOR revenue limit for fiscal 1996
would be $4 billion plus the rate of inflation
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and population growth for the previous fis-
cal year. The $8 billion base that existed in
1994 would have been lowered because of the
revenue decline.
Contrary to what critics claim, TABOR’s
ratchet back effect was not the cause of the
budget squeeze between 2001 and today. The
ratchet effect would have restricted spending
only if elected officials had wanted to spend
additional revenue but could not because of
the declining revenue limit. However, in none
of the years between fiscal 2001 and fiscal
2004 did Colorado spend up to the revenue
limit. As mentioned previously, revenues sub-
ject to the TABOR cap fell by more than 12
percent in fiscal 2002 and by an additional
0.5 percent in fiscal 2003.30 Even though rev-
enue rose substantially in fiscal 2004, it did
not exceed the TABOR cap.  
In other words, Colorado politicians were
unable to spend more, not because of the
TABOR limit, but because there wasn’t any
more revenue to spend. That would have
been true even if TABOR didn’t exist. Indeed,
the budget deficit would probably have been
even larger in the absence of TABOR since
state government would have likely spent all
the revenue it collected during the 1990s.
That would have committed the state to
much higher spending before revenue
dropped. It is also important to note that,
despite the brief decline in revenue, govern-
ment taxation in Colorado is still on a steady
upward climb overall.
In fiscal 2005 revenues exceeded the
TABOR limit for the first time since fiscal
2001. Now Governor Owens and the members
of the state legislature are supporting Refer-
endums C and D in a special election in
November 2005. Referendum C—which relates
directly to TABOR—would allow state govern-
ment to spend the tax revenue that is collected
over and above the TABOR cap rather than
rebate it for the next five years.31
Despite Governor Owens’s public profes-
sions of support for TABOR, Referendum C
would make changes to TABOR that would
permanently increase the size of government in
Colorado. Figure 1 shows the trends of the cur-
rent TABOR baseline and the Referendum C
revenue and spending path. 
Under TABOR, government would still be
allowed to grow, although not as much as it
would under Referendum C. Government
revenue and spending would be allowed to
grow by 17 percent from 2005 to 2010 under
TABOR.32 Under Referendum C, govern-
ment revenue and spending would grow by
29 percent during the same period. State gov-
ernment tax revenue would be $1 billion
more than it would be under TABOR in
2010. State revenue would grow a full 10 per-
cent faster in per capita terms between 2005
and 2010 as a result of Referendum C than it
otherwise would. 
That assumes, of course, that the state will
spend only $3.7 billion in anticipated tax sur-
pluses between 2005 and 2010. But Referendum
C gives the state government the power to spend
all revenue that comes into the state, without
regard to the TABOR limit. If revenue estimates
go up—which is very likely now that the United
States is starting to embark on an economic
recovery that will likely include Colorado—then
the state legislature can spend all of that money
without asking further permission from voters.
It’s the equivalent of giving a blank check to the
legislature for the next five years.
That is not just a hypothetical fear. Esti-
mates of future tax surpluses have been going
up over just the last year. In September 2004,
three months before the governor and the state
legislature cut the deal that placed the referen-
dums on the ballot, the Colorado Legislative
Council’s office estimated that the six-year
cumulative TABOR surpluses would amount
to $3.4 billion.33 Today the council’s estimate is
$3.7 billion.34 If each year’s surplus estimate is
off by a similar amount—as is likely in a period
of economic growth when estimates of govern-
ment revenue tend to be too conservative at
both the local and the federal level—then the
amount of tax rebates that voters will give up if
Referendum C passes will go up by at least
another cumulative $1 billion over the next five
years.
What’s worse is that this increase in gov-
ernment spending would be permanent under
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the referendum because it locks in all of the
revenue increases. If Referendum C passes, the
new TABOR base for fiscal 2011 will be set at
the highest amount of money the state col-
lects between 2005 and 2010, plus $100 mil-
lion if Referendum D passes, too.35 This fur-
ther encourages state legislators to spend
every dollar of revenue collected during the
next five years. With no TABOR limit to stop
them, they certainly will. 
Conclusion
Opponents of TABOR have spent the past
few years opportunistically blaming Colorado’s
budget shortfalls on the TABOR limit. However,
an analysis of Colorado’s fiscal history shows
that the state’s budget problems are not being
caused by TABOR. Instead, they stem from a
severe revenue decline coupled with an educa-
tion-funding mandate.
TABOR has taught some very valuable
lessons to fiscal conservatives about how to
properly design fiscal limits. One problem
that has consistently hampered the effective-
ness of fiscal limitations is enforceability.
Indeed, U.S. history provides countless exam-
ples of fiscal limits that have been weakened
by legislatures, nullified by the courts, or sim-
ply not enforced. Those include Article I, sec-
tion 8, of the U.S. Constitution; the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings Act; California’s Gann
Limit; and Washington State’s I-601. 
What has made TABOR more politically
durable than some of the other limits is its pro-
visions for immediate rebates of surplus rev-
enues. Those rebates make the benefits of
TABOR considerably more visible to taxpayers.
Attempts to weaken TABOR typically meet
with considerable resistance since weakening
the TABOR limit would reduce the size of
everyone’s annual tax rebate. TABOR has been
effective in Colorado for more than 10 years,
and most previous efforts to weaken TABOR
at the state level have made little headway.
Overall, TABOR’s low revenue limit cou-
pled with its rebate provisions have made it
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Figure 1
TABOR vs. Referendum C
R
ev
en
ue
 in
 B
ill
io
ns
Fiscal Year
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Office of State Planning and Budgeting, “September 2005 Revenue
Forecast,” September 20, 2005, Table 1, p. 5.
considerably more durable than other rev-
enue and spending limits. Regardless of the
outcome of the election on November 1, fis-
cal conservatives in other states would do
well to emulate Colorado’s TABOR model.
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